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дарство теряет право определять законность использования суб-
ъектом насилия, а этот индивид, равно как и другие индивиды,
решившие к нему присоединиться, более не являются участника-
ми совместного договора с государством и его представителями.
Для таких субъектов исчезают моральные ограничения на при-
менение насилия и имеют моральное право рассматривать госу-
дарственные силовые структуры как силы противника, и, следо-
вательно, использовать против них любые средства, соблюдая
лишь ограничения характерные ведению войн.1 Следуя логике
теории элит Гюстава Ле Бона, можно утверждать, что порожден-
ное отсутствием целей созидания дальнейшее использование
управленческими элитами политических инструментов разруше-
ния фундамента культуры приведет в действие «слепую силу
масс», которая доведет ее до полного развала и установит новую
историческую мудрость, лишенную рациональности и достойных
человека ценностей2.
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HOMO ECONOMICUS IN THE POST-SOCIALIST
TRANSITION:LOOKING FOR THE MOST
APPROPRIATE THEORETICAL TOOLS
ABSTRACT. In the recent decades the limitations of the neoclassical
economics have been increasingly analysed. The criticism primarily
tackles its assumptions on the rationality of atomised actors, efficient
markets, availability of perfect information, and static foundations. Post-
socialist transition additionally questioned straightforwardness of Western
economists applying neoclassical tools. It became evident that other
factors like institutions and values need to be included and thoroughly
researched. At the same time, other approaches to analysis, often
including findings from other social sciences, have been taken into
account as more appropriate.
This paper draws on the Eastern European transformation experience
and focuses on the theoretical support that has been provided since the
1990s. Institutional analysis proved to be very adequate tool for the
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exploration of persistence of informal constraints and their interaction with
the formal ones. Certain aspects of convergence of New Institutional
Economics and New Economic Sociology appear to be very insightful for
the observation of transitional reforms.Furthermore, ex post analyses
clearly recommend the Evolutionary Institutionalist Perspective that was
for a long time neglected by the Washington Consensus proponents
despite the Post-Washington Consensus ideas. Finally, even though the
theory on the transition processes is still in its development, it has become
evident that economics as a discipline benefited through transition
processes.
KEY WORDS: Post-SocialistTransition, Eastern Europe, New Institutional
Economics, New Economic Sociology, Political Economy
1. Introduction, problem identification and its relevance:
Competing approaches to post-socialist transition economies
Only twenty plus years ago there was no theory of transition. This
deficit combined with the consequences of the removal of the old
regime is named «The Tabula Rasa of 1989» (Elster, Offe&Preuss,
1998, p. 25). Economists were fast in starting the research on
transition, but had often analysed it only as an ideological shift
towards democracy and the market economy, and thereby missed the
social, cultural and historical dimensions of transition (Lemke, 2001;
Aligicia, 2006; Pejovich, 2008) and the geopolitical aspect including
the shift of central Europe and the Baltic states towards Western
Europe (Roland, 2002). The overly simplistic discussions on reform
were driven by a metaphor instead of a modern theory and knowledge
of Western economic institutions (Murrell, 1991a) and the same as in
simpler cases, (macro) economics was not enough (Mankiw, 2006;
Lavigne, 2000, as quoted in Aligicia, 2006). The fact that transition
itself makes additionally important is that it is considered to be a
significant and rare window of opportunity that may trigger a large-
scale reform(O. Williamson, 2000).
In the end of the 1980s and beginning of the 1990s transition
affected the lives of at least 1.65 billion people in the world (Roland,
2000). The post-socialist transition in Central and Eastern Europe,
China and Vietnam is considered to be a fundamental change in recent
decades (King, 2002; Kornai, Matyas& Roland, 2008), and the new
political structure in CEE is even treated as a reflection of «the main
direction of historical progress over the last two millennia» (Kornai,
2008a, p. 8). The transition processes in Eastern Europe transformed
the political and economic parameters of the continent (Gros&Stein-
herr, 2004). The analyses on this issue usually focus on the optimal
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speed of transition: «big bang» approach (Sachs, Berg, Balcerowitz,
Murphy, Shleifer and Vishny) versus a gradualist strategy (Roland,
Svejnar, Portes, Murrell) or both depending on the area (Blanchard,
Kornai, Fischer); and understanding reforms (Rodrik, 1996; 1993;
Rodrik&Wacziarg, 2005; Merlevede, 2003; Estrin, 2002; Campos
&Coricelli, 2002). In the initial transition period the focus was on a
neoliberal approach mostly implemented by applying the Washington
Consensus ideas and the result of it was predominantly considered to
be «an unprecedented peacetime disaster» (King, 2002, p. 5). In South
Eastern Europe this topic is additionally specific since there has been
a triple transition: from communism to political democracy, from
economic isolation to an open market, and from a set system of order
to ethnic conflict and social unrest and its implications (Horowitz,
2003; Kaldor, 2007). Combining these two factors proved to worsen
the overall situation, i.e. applying the neoliberal approach to post
conflict recovery has shown to be inappropriate due to numerous
intrinsic contradictions resulting in rising corruption and crime
(Zupcevic, 2007). On the other hand, the case of the Soviet Union
presented the dismantling of the last great multinational empire (J.
Williamson, 1992). Furthermore, the geopolitical factor has played an
important role despite the fact that it was underestimated in the
beginning of transition (Roland, 2000). Besides the non-existing
theory for transition, the decision on using the neoliberal approach
was mainly a consequence of the Western economists’ limited
understanding of the local circumstances and their inclination towards
«quick fixes» and quick wins that were expected to be achieved by
mass privatisation and instant liberalisation. The local experts were
either pushed aside as non-knowledgeable or followed the pres-
criptions from the West without questioning them. The atmosphere in
the general public and among the elites in the society gave a tacit
support to the experts’ passive behaviour. In the beginning of the
1990s new ideological «facts» emerged describing the pre1990s era as
a complete darkness. That oversimplified and banal approach, that
was completely socially acceptable then, made socialism uninteresting
for analysis and made the retroactive change of biographies and
events possible. That «photoshop-effect» was at that point highly
desirable by most of the incumbents, and by some business people and
citizens as well.
Roland (2000) and Kornai (2008a) argue that research on
transition, in order to capture the reality and benefit from different
angles of specialisation, must interact with various other fields of
economics and in that way simultaneously develop more general
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lessons for economics. Rodrik (2010, p. 40) makes it clear that
economists have the same cognitive biases as other scientists do:
«overconfidence, and the tendency to join the herd, and proclivity to
overlook contradictory evidence». As a result of that, they tend to
promote and be involved in «universal blueprints only loosely
grounded in theory and evidence». Furthermore, there is a tendency
among economists to observe the problem only from their own area of
expertise (Aaron, 1994; Rodrik, 2009). In order to avoid fragmented
views and inefficient recommendations, Rodrik (2009; 2010)
emphasises the need to consider local circumstances, include local
knowledge, use experiments and above all be pragmatic. In order to
explain a divergence in the performance of post-socialist countries,
research on transition was forced to take a broader view than markets
and elections only, and hence under the governance umbrella
incorporate corruption, legal frameworks, accountable institutions and
underlying factors like trust (K. Mueller, 2010). To sum up, post-
socialist transformation was at the beginning faced with very limited
theoretical support, while at the same time
«post-communist societies faced a complex, multi-level process, in
which constitutional, legislative, institutional factors and informal
social networks, cultural values and attitudes were all part of the
problem… ‘awesome challenge’ of simultaneously reorganising the
political, economic and legal systems and redefining the national,
ethnic and cultural identities.» (Aligicia, 2006, p. 36)
This article seeks to identify and elaborate on the most adequate
theoretical tools for exploring the post-socialist transformation in
Eastern Europe. Section 1 presents an overview of the limitations of
neoclassical economics for the analysis of Eastern European
transition. Section 2 seeks to explain the advantages of the New
Institutional Economics for the exploration of transitional processes
by emphasising the importance of institutions and interaction of
formal and informal ones. While presenting New Economic
Sociology, Section 3 compares it with NIE and questions their
ongoing convergence. Section 4 concludes by pinpointing the major
insights that can be drawn from New Institutional Economics and
New Economic Sociology.
2. The applicability of neoclassical economics
on Eastern European transition
It is widely claimed that understanding economic arrangements is
essential for a proper understanding of social organisations and
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therefore it is misleading if economists are not involved in the
analysis of large social changes. That fact is connected both with the
afore-mentioned non-cooperative attitude of the economists and
economists’denial of knowledge from other fields. Both trends seem
to be changing. In that sense, Ben-Ner and Putterman (1999, pp. 3-72)
strongly argue that the neoclassical acceptance of a purely economic
man ignores the realistic complexities in human behaviour and
psychology stating that in the natural selection theory scientists
proved that a self-interested agent is impossible. They notice many
modifications of a rigorous rationality concept that have been made in
order to adjust it to the real world observations. At the same time they
provide reasons showing the need for those modifications. The first
reason is the high cost of market institutions in case only self-
interested individuals participate in the market and as a consequence,
values that indirectly determine the costs of the market operations.
The second reason is the need to include values in the predictions
based on game-theoretic models of preferences in order to solve the
impasses found in the theory. And the third reason is the essential
insertion of the value-institution linkages into economic analysis as
inevitable in addressing contemporary problems in society that
include families, firms and states, and can be found under the «crisis
of values» umbrella. While trying to avoid universal economic rules
dealing with both bounded and unbounded rationality concepts, Jaklič
and Zagoršek (2003) advocate the holistic approach to rationality as
the most appropriate for transition countries. This complex approach
treats rationality as bounded and contextual and therewith
acknowledges the role of values, institutions and tradition combined
with limited information availability.
Aaron (1994) also warns that the way economists in their
evaluations of policies and institutions take values, habits and social
norms as given and beyond analysis and public policy influence is
misleading. When comparing economists’ utility assumptions with
actual behaviour and modern psychology, Aaron (1994) claims that
the idea that people behave as if their preferences were stable,
egoistic, and rational, cannot explain human behaviour in most of the
cases. That resulted in buoyant economic and other social sciences’
analyses of irrationalities, paradoxes and anomalies. Aaron (1994)
lists four simplifications that he finds seriously questionable. First, the
assumption of egoistic and linear utility functions is not in accordance
with plausible psychology. Second, the economists’ view of the world
changing gradually without any sudden transformation does not take
into account many events where many requirements need to be
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fulfilled at once in order for the necessary jump to happen rather than
continuous linear function. Third, the exclusion of complex dynamic
processes does not consider the path dependence possibilities. And
finally, the fourth factor listed by Aaron (1994) is the exclusion of
variables by many analysts that is contrary to their common sense, but
they do it mostly because of the measurement or scientific adequacy
problems. In line with that, the neuroeconomic research (Zak, 2008)
shows that humans assess the utility of a variety of options, but then
derive the economic value based on social interactions. It is therefore
proposed to call them «homo reciprocans» instead of homo
economicus because they are considered to be reciprocating beings
highly influenced by emotions. As for transition societies, the well-
known term is «homo sovieticus» ironically coined by Zinovyev. He
tried to portray a somewhat hypocrite personality typically found in
the Eastern bloc that was greatly defined by the artificial premises of
socio-political system on one hand and personal conformism and
opportunism on the other.Recent research (The Economist, 2011) in
Russia suggests that after more than two decades of transition Homo
sovieticus hasn’t disappeared. Quite contrary, he has mutated and
reproduced and has become more cynical and aggressive. In addition,
being dissatisfied with the current situation, he feels nostalgic for the
previous regime and predominantly regrets that that period of social
safety, perceived public morality and better living standard finished.
Mansbridge (1999) identifies two trends that claim a bigger
importance of the values than of the self-interest in predicting the
behaviour of the firms, families, political and economic systems. One
is focused on the role of institutions, and the other one on the
application of economic analysis on noneconomic venues.
Mansbridge (1999) confirms that analysis based only on rationality
and self-interest will not be accurate or adequate for explaining and
predicting human behaviour. When researching the relations between
values and institutions, it is necessary to identify the proximate and
ultimate resources of the value systems of the actors whereby former
ones are context- and path-dependent and the latter depend on actors’
structure of thinking, and emotive and cognitive capacities.
Besides the human psychology dimension, the dimensions of time
and general dynamics seem to be missing in the common economic
assumptions. North (2005, p. 16) states that an ergodic1 economy
would had timeless and static foundations, but the world we live in
                   
1Ergodic means:lacking any definite plan or order or purpose; tending in probability to a
limiting form that is independent of the initial conditions. North uses this term very often.
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has opposite characteristics.This statement mainly refers to two
aspects: economics and institutions are changing; and as a
consequence of that, they need to be analysed in their dynamics. That
analysis requires different tools than the ones provided by the
neoclassical paradigm and its methodological hypotheses and
principles which are deemed to be inappropriate for the analysis of
human nature and the real world. North (2005, p. 65) takes into
account three fundamental deficiencies of neoclassical economics: «it
is frictionless, it is static and it does not take into account human
intentionality». North’s (2005, pp. 76-77) criticism of neoclassical
economics also touches upon the equation connecting absent
government intervention with good economic performance and
reminds again that the results in a certain market are rather a function
of the constraints enforced that consequently create the incentive
structure in that market. Moreover, North (2005, p. 24) does not find
the rationality assumption to be necessarily wrong, but he considers it
to be inappropriate for all the complex situations that are intrinsic to
institutional change. He also believes that it does not treat
appropriately the relationship of the mind to the environment. So far
limited research has been done in order to understand the
interdependence of the evolving social structure the human mind
created (North, 2005, p. 84). When it comes to structural economic
policy in the transition process, it becomes apparent that neoclassical
economics neglected or assumed structural and historical factors that
needed to be emphasised and were emphasised by institutionalist
approach (Aligicia, 2006).
Murrell (1991a) questions if neoclassical economics can underpin
the reform of centrally planned economies. Considering that
capitalism is proved to be more successful than central planning, it
seemed to automatically become the major source of ideas for
changes. Yet, the institutions of capitalism vary and cannot be
implemented instantaneously. The keys of capitalist successes need to
be identified and appropriately interpreted in order to eventually apply
them to former socialist countries. According to Murrell (1991b)
economic theory plays a major role in helping reformers understand
and select the interpretation of the experiences of both capitalist and
socialist systems. Murrell (1991a) draws attention to the following
issues that neoclassical economics does not provide appropriate tools
and solutions to deal with: information asymmetry being more present
in post-socialist than in regular market economy conditions, behaviour
of the actors and expectations about the other actors’ behaviour,
positive correlation of free market and the welfare of the consumers
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reflected in a variety of products offered, a second welfare theorem
and solving the trade-off between equality and efficiency. Murrell
(1991a) finds that when using neoclassical paradigm to compare the
empirical evidence of socialist and capitalist economies the results
might be misleading and based on the previous claims neoclassical
economics «is not a strong candidate to provide underpinning for
reform» (Murrell, 1991a, p. 73).
Moreover, Kornai (2008a) notes that mainstream economics
ignores possible locked-in deficits of capitalism and leaves the
criticism of it to the most extreme scientists. At the same time there is
a belief that those minuses in the system can be resolved by
appropriate measures and that there is no notion of possible inborn
defects that cannot be overcome. Neuber (1993) also identifies the
deficiencies of the neoclassical approach in Eastern Europe. When
analysing the situation in the beginning of the1990s he notices two
key shortcomings: denial of institutional inertia and its implications
and a reductionist view of politics. The institutional issue resulted in
an unrealistic policy design and the political issue in radicalism,
policy overshooting and radical destabilisation. Even though the
market-enhancing institutions were included in the transition
prescriptions, their lacking creation was not considered a condition
sine qua non. Neuber (1993) explains it by the neoclassical
assumption of markets operating in a frictionless world whereby
institutions do not have an instrumental role. Aligicia (2006, pp. 27-
28) summarises the applicability of the mainstream economics at the
beginning of transition as «useful only for a limited set of
problems…relevant primarily for a quantitative policy».
The neoclassical theory of efficient markets may be thoroughly
applied when there are no transaction costs. Institutions matter when
the transactions costs emerge (North, 1992). When analysing the
contribution of the NIE to an understanding of the transition problem
North (1997, p. 2) claims that «It would be little exaggeration to say
that, while neo-classical theory is focused on the operation of efficient
markets, few Western economists understand the institutional
requirements essential to the creation of such markets since they
simply take them for granted». In line with North’s opinion, Roland
(2002) warns that economists examined only economic factors and
ignored deep institutional transformation that is closely linked with
the economic transition. Opper (2008) notes a significant increase in
research and measurements using NIE to explore transition economies
and explains it as a way to substitute the deficits found in the
neoclassical models. In his paper on the transaction costs of transition
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in CEE, Pejovich’s (2003a) starting point is that the process of
transition is more of a cultural than technical issue, and therefore the
results of the transition in CEE countries are not accidental. Moreover,
Pejovich (1993) claims that Western economists, particularly the
neoclassical ones, think only in terms of immediate adjustments to the
new equilibria and by doing so do not take into consideration
historical and social values that determine people’s behaviour in the
short and long run. This way despite their expertise they tried to
implement an institutional change that is fully exogenous to the
system. Their models did not include informal institutions like beliefs
and behaviours deeply embedded in the transition society and as a
result there were consequences impossible to predict by any economic
model. Besides its lacking ability to solve transition problems, Ben-
Ner and Putterman (1999, pp. 13-17) claim that strict neoclassical
economics cannot help capitalist societies to solve the problems in
their societies either. They remind that despite the capitalist triumph at
the end of the century, social problems seem to be growing and
typically ranging from crime and family instability over
unemployment to social deprivation. It is noted that despite economic
forces largely influencing decision making regarding social problems,
economists have made insufficient tracks into the analysis of those
pressing issues. This again implies the strict distinction between the
rational choice perspective on one side and the creation and changes
of values on the other.
There seems to be a consensus regarding the role and limits Western
economists had in post-socialist countries, especially in the beginning
of transition. This issue has been described from various corners by
Pejovich, Niskanen, Neuber, Roland and Murrell. Niskanen (1991, pp.
233-238) claims that in former socialist countries it is impossible to use
the same tools as for the market economies in order to provide the
explanation of the differences between the two when observing the
changes of the productivity and income in certain periods or among
regions. This is due to the market economist’s inclination towards
rationales covering key development factors like investment, human
and natural resources, and eventually government policies, rather than
basic institutions of market economy that are usually taken for granted
because they haven’t changed significantly over time. Niskanen (1991,
p. 233) considers «less visible or quantifiable differences» of the basic
market institutions to be crucial for comparison, in other words «soft
infrastructure». Furthermore, Neuber (1993) emphasises the interdepen-
dence of political, economic, institutional and cultural factors in the
transitional policy environment and continues:
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«The erroneous belief in the automaticity of market-based
incentives and signals, especially when coupled with the advocacy of
whole sale import of institutions that neglects the existence of
surviving institutions, however much disliked, has led to vast
underestimation of the difficulties and subtleties involved.» (Neuber,
1993, p. 527)
In accordance with that, North (1990, p. 111) states that focus on
rational choice and efficient market ‘blinded’ the scientists to the
evident consequences of incomplete information and complex envi-
ronments. That combined with previously elaborated factors implies
the necessity of cooperation of economists with other social scientists
in order to achieve faster progress (Aaron, 1994; Roland, 2000;
Rodrik, 2009; etc.).
Yet, Rodrik (2009, pp. 15-16) believes that neoclassical economic
analysis is more applicable than commonly considered by policy
practitioners. First-order economic principles do not make universal
policy sets. While using local opportunities and being aware of local
obstacles, reformers need to create institutional design that delivers
first-order principles effectively. In the process of securing property
rights, two main threats are identified: individual predators passively
«helped» by the weak state and state that may extort private property
for «public good» or as a means of aggression against other states
(Dixit, 2004). Rodrik (2009, p. 15) stresses that «[t]here is no unique
correspondence between the functions that good institutions perform
and the form that such institutions take». Rodrik (2009, p. 16) further
distinguishes between the tools necessary to start and to sustain
economic growth. Whereas for the former usually limited reforms
suffice, for the latter the reform package is more demanding since it
requires a very solid institution building that will work in the long
term. That institutional underpinning is also built over a longer period
of time.
3. New Institutional Economics and its applicability
Until the 1990s new institutionalism seemed to be at the periphery
of the mainstream economics, post-socialist transition processes gave
it a rise and are considered as a key driver of its development and
wider acceptance (Aligicia, 2006). New Institutional Economics may
provide us with the background answer emphasising the key
characteristics of both formal and informal institutions that may be
applicable in every country. Focusing on institutional change as a
whole process, and thereby considering the large scale reforms like
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the ones in the former socialist countries, deepens the analysis and
further connects it with transition economics. Subfields of New
Institutional Economics have developed since the 1990s. The relevant
ones for this analysis are Transition Economics (categorized by
Roland) and Lawlessness and Economics (put forward by Dixit,
2004). Transition Economics covers a variety of topics connected with
the transformation of a centrally planned into market economy,
whereas Lawlessness and Economics is mainly concerned with
property rights and contracts and in its purest sense investigates the
economies characterised by absence or ineffectiveness of government.
In addition to those two fields, Transaction Cost Economics is in line
with NIE particularly by recognizing transaction costs and contrary to
the mainstream economics it accepts that individual knowledge of the
world is imperfect and that all feasible contracts are incomplete.
Economic development is no longer treated as an inevitable and to
some extent accidental process of evolution from local autarky to
specialisation. On the contrary, it is regarded as a reaction to the
transformation of institutions that support social and commercial
relationships (Klein, 1999, p. 461). It is also claimed that initial
conditions can be overrated and that appropriate incentives can make
a substantial difference, as shown by transition countries with less
favourable initial conditions (Shleifer&Vishny, 1999). North (1990;
1997) claims that institutions and their changes shape economic
performance by determining the cost of transacting and producing,
and that they are established to reduce uncertainty in exchange (North,
1992). Roland (2004) notes that Adam Smith’s question on the
allocation of the resources has been revived by the institutional
economists and that the interpretations of the institutions are at the
same time endless. In line with that, Nye (2008) notes that the
founders of modern economics guided by Adam Smith would easily
determine each nation’s institutions like property rights and stable
rules. He believes that during several decades the availability of
capital, natural resources, and technical development were probably
overestimated as the determinants of economic performance, i.e. the
reasons that made the difference between poor and rich countries.
Besides that, there was a strong belief in planning, being it based on
the socialist view or in milder cases Keynesian neoclassical
standpoint. Helping poor countries through foreign aid was done
predominantly by transferring capital, technical convergence or
improving the quality of education. At their beginnings, development
economists didn’t pay attention to the institutions, but only to the
aforementioned factors such as natural resources, capital accu-
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mulation, poor economic policies, technological development, and
inadequate education (Easterly, 2001). Further analysis showed
significant deficits in these explanations. North’s work in the 1970s
showing that institutions of capitalism, or more precisely their growth-
enhancing aspects, are in the long-run in charge of economic success
was very controversial at first. The factors that were previously the
focus, like technology transfer and capital accumulation, seemed to be
relevant for the economic results and the relative advancement or
downturn of nations in the short-run. Repeatedly, economists are
considering institutions as the most significant issue for economic
performance. The role of politics, law, demography, anthropology,
history and cognitive science comes into focus and the inter-
disciplinary perspective is mandatory (Nye, 2008). Rodrik (2009,
p. 154) is convinced that the central question is no longer «Do
institutions matter?» but «Which institutions matter and how does one
acquire them?».
The mantra «Institutions matter» started at least in 1997 (World
Bank, 1997) and is the main argument of both older and newer-style
institutional economics (O. Williamson, 2008). «Institutions matter»
seems to be fully accepted now (Rodrik, 2009; Aoki, 2011; etc.). The
studies showing institutions as a key determinant of wealth and long-
term growth vastly contributed to the «institutions matter» stream
(Hall & Jones, 1999; Acemoglu, Johnson & Robinson, 2001; Easterly
& Levine, 2003; Rodrik, Subramanian &Trebbi, 2004). These studies
proved that more developed countries nowadays had better political
and economic institutions than in the past. Accordingly, they consider
institutional quality to be key statistics of economic development.
Nevertheless, it appears that it took a long time for economists to
include institutions into economic models. This move is considered to
be an upgrade for the economic models because it adds realism. Yet,
that also means more complexity «because reality is messily
complex» (Shirley, 2010, p. 5). The critics of the «institutions matter»
stream claim the opposite, their view is that the discussion of the
importance of institutions is dangerously oversimplified (Sachs
2003a; 2003b). The main criticism is rooted in strong correlation of
economic growth and demographic variables with geographical and
ecological variables, scarce natural resources and malaria transmission
in particular. Still, it is claimed that «[I]nstitutions may matter, but
they don’t matter exclusively» (Sachs, 2003b, p. 28) and that good
institutions surely matter, but bad ones can deteriorate the economic
situation even if starting in favourable conditions (Sachs, 2003b). In
general, it is worth noting that the opponents of the «institutions
101
matter» are at the same time proponents of the Washington Consensus
approach.
O. Williamson (2008, p. xxiv) reminds of the key features of NIE
projects: focussing on feasible alternatives, deepening the perspective
of the actions of agents, better understanding of economic organi-
sation’s mechanisms, operational approach covering and attempting to
optimise micro level of transactions, governance and rules of the
game and therewith connected implications and policy recom-
mendations. O. Williamson’s scheme of institutions (2000, p. 597)
ranges from institutions endogenous in the short term towards the
medium-term ones like institutions of law, ending with the ones that
require much longer time periods to change.The New Institutional
Economics is mainly concerned with levels 2 and 3 from the O.
Williamson’s figure; the social embeddedness found in the level 1 is
usually taken as given by the institutional economists. Level 3 is
concerned with the reorganisation of transactions among governance
structures, and usually undergoes re-examination in the one year to
ten years period. Level 4 is subject to the neoclassical analysis
wherein the firm is usually seen through the production function.
Following the findings that countries can reach middle-income
levels despite some corruption, but further growth requires much
better institutions (Easterly 2001, pp. 234-235, pp. 245-248; Rodrik,
2003, pp. 16-17), Dixit (2004) also warns that the design or reform of
formal institutions should ensure that they interact well with existing
informal ones and that it may be necessary to accept some transitional
worsening of performance. Ensminger (1997) confirms that claiming
that formal institutions may not reach their objectives if existing
informal rights are not overridden. While describing the new
institutional economics as «a boiling cauldron of ideas», O.
Williamson (2000, p. 610) also notes that the informal institutions, or
institutions of embeddedness from his model of NIE, «are an
important but underdeveloped part of the story». The common
explanation for this area remaining under-researched is the fact that
due to its nature economists left it to other social science disciplines,
particularly to sociologists (Opper, 2008). Besides inequality of
wealth and income as one field, Roland (2000, p. 344) recognizes
social behaviour, norms, and capital as the other important field that is
lacking research on transition. Informal institutions have mainly
spontaneous origins, and because of those evolutionary origins they
are characterised by inertia, it takes even centuries and millennia to
change them. Roland (2004, p. 128) stresses that «[I]n order to have a
meaningful understanding of institutions as systems, we need to
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understand interactions between different institutions…..institutions
may themselves be viewed as the interaction of fast-moving (political)
and slow-moving (cultural) institutions». Apart from political
institutions, democratic and participatory culture is proved to be one
of the key factors for long run economic growth. Furthermore,
because of the speed of the change of political institutions, the system
of values and beliefs plays an additional role in possibly ensuring
complementarity with formal institutions (Jellema& Roland, 2011). In
transitional societies formal institutions are usually underdeveloped,
vague and partially absent, and those shortcomings are usually
compensated by the informal institutions and that may result both in
efficient and inefficient outcomes (Vehovec, 2002b).Informal
constraints «come from socially transmitted information and are a part
of the heritage that we call culture… Culture provides a language-
based conceptual framework for encoding and interpreting the
information that the senses are presenting to the brain.» (North, 2008,
p. 37).Culture is an even murkier concept than institutions are, Lal
(1999) claimed, and also noted that even the Chicago School started
acknowledging culture as a part of the social capital even though until
a few years ago it was completely ignored. Furthermore, Chicago Booth
School of Business emphasises behavioural economists and psycho-
logists working there as an issue of excellence and ability to widen the
conventional research horizons (Economist, 2010, July 3, p. 29).
4. New Institutional Economics versus New Economic Sociology
In the last decade Aligicia and Boettke (2009, pp. 106-108) note an
increased interest in the intersection between economics and
sociology that mostly resulted from a lacking satisfaction of both
economists and sociologists regarding the ways that social questions
are addressed by the others. It is therefore proposed that socio-
economics should replace neoclassical economics. Along those
evolving avenues, it is worth exploring if the transition processes have
also contributed in bringing closer New Institutional Economics and
New Economics Sociology. While warning that «the study of
economics was needlessly truncated», O. Williamson (1998, pp. 77—
78) emphasises two background conditions that take part in the
criticism of the mainstream economics: embeddedness concept by
Granovetter and the attributes of human actors by Simon, both
pointing out the nature of the individuals and groups; and as a result
of that norms, customs and modes of conduct that differ among
societies and have implications on the economics, decision-making in
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particular. Economists claim that sociology is included in New
Institutional Economics. Yet, although economic sociologists wel-
come the idea of inclusion of institutions in mainstream economics,
they still view the new institutional economics analysis through the
lenses of neoclassical economics and its focus on efficient markets
provides a framework with certain deficits such as inattention to social
structure and to the beliefs of individuals (Granovetter&Swedberg,
2001).Yet, they also note that in the 1990s North asserted the central
role of actors’ belief systems for economic outcomes. The networks
usually play a key role in the emergence of the economic institution;
their importance diminishes once the development is «locked in».
Economic sociologists believe that this reductionist concept of
economic action is exaggerated because it does not connect
economics with other social sciences. Furthermore, they consider
economic sociology tools more appropriate to deal with numerous
empirical issues in real world circumstances (Granovetter&Swedberg,
2001, pp. 8 -11). Regarding economic actions as socially situated or
embedded, economic sociologists (Granovetter&Swedberg, 2001, pp.
11 -14) emphasise networks of relationships rather than atomized
actors. They believe that a network view encourages a gradual
analysis of the causal process rather than focus on one decisive factor
that turns out to be the foundation of a too simplistic theory. This way,
social mechanisms are correctly identified and the concept of
networks is considered to be very close to empirical reality. It avoids
conceptual errors from mainstream economics and New Institutional
Economics. Economic sociologists claim that explaining the life cycle
of social institutions through their alleged efficiency is inadequate
compared to the findings of social structure mapping. They also
explain the popularity of NIE views through «their apparently
parsimonious solution of otherwise intractable problems» (Grano-
vetter&Swedberg, 2001, p. 12). InstitutionalistAligicia (2006, pp. 32–
34) supports the notion of the strong role of networks in the society
and claims that once this is accepted the analysis of the formal
institutions solely seems like studying only the tip of the iceberg. In
light of post-communist transition, Aligicia (2006) notes that
networks of cooperation from the communism period can easily
become corruption networks in the new system, and vice versa,
former opposition networks can become entrepreneurial and proactive
in a positive manner. The notion of embeddedness is also used in the
other, similar context of business-government relations; Evans (1995)
named it «embedded autonomy». He basically states that government
should keep its autonomy from the private sector, but government can
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receive important information from the private sector only if it is in a
constant relationship with it.
Regarding the social construction of economic institutions,
economic sociologists (Granovetter&Swedberg, 2001, pp. 14-18)
welcome a relatively recent idea of including institutions in
mainstream economic analysis, especially in NIE that is supposed to
require social analysis. Yet, they consider it only superficially social
because economists do not consider why and how the actors in their
own view behave. They rather focus on a revealed preference. On the
other hand, Nye (2008, pp. 72-73) sees the concept mainly through the
time dimension by considering that new institutional economists
usually treat institutions as exogenous to most people’s behaviour in
the short term, and almost completely endogenous in the long term.
Granovetter (2001, p. 61) claims that «anonymous market of
neoclassical models is virtually non-existent in economic life and that
transactions of all kinds are rife with the social connections
described.» He argues that economic behaviour and institutions are to
a large extent influenced by social relations and distinguishes between
two extremes: over socialized and under socialized conception of
human action. Yet, despite the opposite views their common
denominator is the atomization of actors; in the undersocialised
account it comes from the self-interest, and in the oversocialised
account it is the result of adopted behavioural norms. Despite the
contrary views it should be noticed that both theories deal with the
concept of atomized actors. Whereas in the undersocialised view
atomization is caused by narrow self-interest, in the oversocialised
view it is primarily founded on internalized behavioural patterns, and
current social relations influence behaviour only to a minor extent
(Granovetter, 2001, Ch 2). In the article commonly seen as a starting
point of New Economic Sociology Granovetter (2001, p. 55) notes
that even when economists deal with social relations thoroughly, they
do not take into account historical and structural embeddedness of
relations. They instead categorize relations according to current
positions or roles and that exclusion from the wider social context
results in a «paradoxical effect of preserving atomized decision
making even when decisions are seen to involve more than one
individual... the use of an oversocialised conception –that of actors
behaving exclusively in accord with their prescribed roles- to
implement an atomized, undersocialised view» (Granovetter, 2001, p.
55). Ben-Ner and Putterman (1999, pp. 3-69) significantly relax the
undersocialised view assumptions through preferences perspective.
Ben-Ner and Putterman (1999, pp. 3-69) still consider that homo
105
economicus dealing with maximisation issues and thereby often
cooperating with other self-interested individuals should be central in
the economic methodology. Yet, both the limits of their rationality
and their other- and process related preferences need to be taken into
account. Contrary to the self-regarding preferences, other-regarding
preferences are connected with the consumption and the outcomes of
other people, and process-regarding preferences are synonyms for
values, sometimes also labelled as behaviour and ethics. The process-
regarding preferences may also be explained as a way in which people
behave and reach outcomes of interest. The focus of Ben-Ner and
Putterman’s work are process-regarding references and to a lesser
extent other-regarding preferences. Both of these groups of prefe-
rences are highly influenced by the genetic predispositions and the
environment in which individuals have lived. Preferences, cognitive
abilities and habits, and the level of the bounded rationality are
considered to be determinants of behaviour.Moreover, the underlying
idea of social embeddedness is found in Whitley’s (1997) business
system approach, a framework in which significant international
differences in corporate governance and doing business in general are
predominantly explained by nationally specific social institutions.
Based on some current trends in NIE it may be argued that NIE has
come closer to some of the major assumptions of the Economic
Sociology, oversocialised behaviour in particular. This convergence
(Table ) is increasingly seen in the works of the last decade. In that
regard, despite the differences in approaches and their findings,
selected works in Ben-Ner and Putterman’s (1999) volume on
economics, values, and organisation unanimously confirm the
necessity to widen the perspective of analysis of homo economicusby
not only including process-regarding preferences, but making them
endogenous. Brousseau et al. (2011b, p. 16) claim that further
developments are needed in order to obtain essential additional
knowledge of institutional elements and evolution, and this explo-
ration will necessarily include other social and human sciences. The
emphasis of including other sciences seems to be overwhelmingly
present throughout this review of scientific contributions.
In the overview of the works of NIE scholars on the fundamental
assumptions and their consequences for institutional change,
Brousseau et al. (2011b, pp. 4-7) distinguish between prosocial and
self-interested behaviour. Pro-social behaviour, contrary to self-
regarding optimizers, includes pro-social preferences like altruism and
fairness that seem to strengthen institutional stability. Pro-social
behaviour is seen through two perspectives. The first one is still
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rationally oriented and is explained as homo economicus with
deviations in behaviour (authored by Benabou and Tirole in 2006; as
presented in Brousseau et al. 2011b, pp. 5-6). The «extended» model
of a self-interested agent whose real world behaviour is explained by
deviations or anomalies was previously noticed by Aaron (1994) and
Ben-Ner and Putterman (1999). The second perspective of pro-social
behaviour is explained in two ways: «preference based» (authored by
Gintis et al. In 2005; as presented in Brousseau et al. 2011b, pp. 5-6)
and «belief based» (authored by Binmore in 2010; as presented in
Brousseau et al. 2011b, pp. 5-6). The former is focused on other-
regarding preferences rooted in human behaviour that are strongly
related with the affiliation to a certain community, i.e. social
preferences influence the actor’s utility function. And the latter
explains pro-social behaviour as significantly dependent on the beliefs
of the expected behaviours of other actors and consider it to be based
on Nash equilibrium. A common issue for both approaches is
endogeneity of creation and stability of «natural» inclination to
cooperation and membership in a certain group. North’s stream seems
to be in between these two perspectives regarding institutional
stability, because it does not explicitly analyse pro-social behaviour.
Instead, it claims that institutional stability is rooted in human beliefs.
Table 1
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Based on Ben-Ner and Putterman’s work aimed at moving beyond
self-regarding and other-regarding preferences towards a theory that
incorporates value-motivated agents, Sugden (1999) proposes that in
order to have a theory of values that is useful for economics, it should
be naturalistic, have explanatory power, and make values endogenous.
Neoclassical economics supposes exogeneity of preferences, hence
takes them as given without explaining them. Yet, at the same time it
assumes their transitivity, completeness, and convexity, and that small
range of variations of preferences increases the explanatory power. In
order to satisfy the naturalism condition, Sugden (1999) proposes the
absence of moral facts in the analysis of the emergence of moral sense
as there is a common trap between moral beliefs and substantive
moral statements. He is trying to prove that people are to a relevant
extent motivated by a desire to meet other people’s expectations. He
claims that the content of the norms should not be taken as given even
though the inclination to create normative expectations is taken as a
given in his analysis. Sugden’s rationale of normative expectations
varies from Ben-Ner and Putterman’s (1999) idea of norms as
solutions to issues faced by communities. In their view norms are
socially functional, consciously adopted and transmitted top down in a
family, religious community, school or political sphere. In contrast,
Sugden (1999, p. 84) sees normative expectations as «unintended
consequences of initially self-interested behaviour». The concept of
normative expectations is likely to be applicable to the collectivist
societies like the transitional one where the opinion of a community
plays a very important role.
Nee (2003) discusses new institutionalisms in economics and
sociology in order to identify the key features of a New Institutional
Economic Sociology that deals with the role of beliefs, norms and
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institutions in the economic life. He investigates the interaction of the
formal elements of institutional structures with informal networks and
norms that influence economic activities. Based on Grano-
vetter’sembeddedness concept, Nee (2003, p. 47) claims that «rational
action in economic life is facilitated, motivated and governed by
shared beliefs, social relations, norms and institutions». Furthermore,
economic sociologists see institutions as socially constructed arenas
where actors act according to their interests, rather than their
incentives and disincentives only. Instead of putting emphasis on the
role of the state in enforcing formal rules, sociologists stress the role
of close-knit groups in creating and sustaining the norms and consider
relations and networks to be the key of understanding the connections
between the informal social organisation and formal institutions (Nee,
2003, pp. 50-51). Nee (2003, pp. 54-55) concludes with the same
thought that economists include embeddedness into their models,
sociologists may find it useful to include economic concepts into the
modern sociological approach.
When comparatively observing NIE and NES, Nee (2003, p. 16)
argues that O. Williamson’s claim on the complementarities of
transaction cost economics and embeddedness is not unexpected. It
may be argued that the connection of O. Williamson’s approach is
also visible in his four levels of social analysis where the top level is
named the social embeddedness level consisting of tradition and
norms of behaviour. Nee (2003, pp. 22-23) considers the usual NIE
definitions of institutions to be constraining from the sociological
point of view and suggests broader definition that would position the
institutions as a channel for collective action and institutional change
would be primarily concerned with the realignment of interests, norms
and power. A dynamic game theoretic model of declining political
commitment in state socialism (Nee, 2003, p. 42, based on Nee and
Lian, 1994) is of particular importance studying institutional change
in transition because it provides the explanation of the incumbents’
behaviour during the initial transition years.
5. Conclusion
Transition is considered to be a comprehensive process of change.
The overall complexity of the transition process is also described by
metaphors like changing the motor of the plane during the flight
(Roland, 2000) or rebuilding the ship at sea (Elster et al., 1998). In
SEE this topic is additionally specific since there has been a triple
transition: in the political and economic arena, and from a set system
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of order to ethnic conflict and social unrest and its implications.
Combining these two factors proved to worsen the overall situation.
Ex post analyses claim that (pseudo) neoliberal approach brought
additional contradictions and development delays because of the
inherited particularities and unforeseeable conditions in South Eastern
Europe.
Overall, the beginning of transition was faced with rather big
discrepancy. On one side, transition was deemed a historical window
of opportunity that was supposed to trigger important reforms. And on
the other, a very scarce theoretical support that consequently led to
predominantly misleading practical support for the creation and
implementation of those reforms. Although the centrally planned and
selfmanaged socialist systems were well understood, their legacy for
subsequent events was underestimated. It has been shown that the
claim on the linear trajectory from planned towards market economy
was misleading. Furthermore, transition countries differ among them
mostly because of their long-run complex history (also explained as
multiple pasts) and their initial transition policies. Besides neglecting
the distinctiveness of the transition of every single country and region,
the factors like culture, values, norms of behaviour, and tradition were
mostly denied as well. This predominantly led to a uniform approach
that undervalued local conditions and could neither predict nor
address the divergence of countries’ development. It appears that
divergence is rising and that transition countries are «far more
heterogenous than they were twenty years ago» (Cornia, 2012, p.
293). To underline, the socialist past was well known, but its legacy
was underestimated.
When analysing postsocialist transformation, i.e. comparing homo
economicus in theory and in real transition society, there appear to be
useful alternatives to neoclassical economics. Institutional analysis
proved to be a very adequate tool for the exploration of transition. It
has particularly verified its applicability through the research of the
persistence of informal constraints and their interaction with the
formal ones. These complex interrelationships have also provoked the
usage of newly emerged interdisciplinary approaches in order to
obtain a more nuanced picture of changes in societies. Certain trends
and findings from New Institutional Economics and New Economic
Sociology show their convergence as particularly useful for the
observation of reforms in transition countries. They actually seem to
reflect the movements there, even though most of the selected studies
were not executed in transitional societies. The research on networks
and the oversocialised view of society is suggested to be borrowed
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from the New Economic Sociology in order to clarify the underlying
human infrastructure in transition societies. When reforming a society,
the common denominator in most of the studies from mentioned fields
may be found in the recommendations for a better use of local
knowledge and a deeper understanding of previous and existing
institutions and local circumstances. Furthermore, ex post analyses
clearly recommend the Evolutionary institutionalist perspective that
was for a long time neglected by the Washington Consensus
proponents despite the Post-Washington Consensus ideas. The
Political Economy research on reform implementation within large-
scale economic and political changes is recognized as complementary
and left for further research. Finally, even though the theory on the
transition processes is still in its development, it has become apparent
that economics as a discipline gained added value through transition
processes. In other words, «the transition experience of the nineties
was both a testing ground for the traditional body of economic theory
and an invaluable source of new information about conditions for
successful capitalist development» (Roland, 2004, p. 110).
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АНОТАЦІЯ. Розглянуто проблеми розвитку якісно нової, фізико-
економічної методології сучасної науки. Досліджено можливості за-
стосування міждисциплінарних підходів до вирішення еколого-
економічних питань. Узагальнено особливості фізичної економії. За-
пропоновано авторський підхід до розвитку та втілення ідей С. Подо-
линського, М. Руденка та В. Вернадського в новітню теоретичну еко-
номіку. Обґрунтовано фізико-економічне моделювання споживання
та заощадження природного капіталу.
КЛЮЧОВІ СЛОВА: негентропійний феномен розвитку, екологічно
збалансована економіка, фізична економія, міждисциплінарна мето-
дологія економічної науки, ноосферна модель економіки.
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